Beginning Aug. 6, the Ukrainian military launched a surprise, cross-border offensive against Russia in the eastern Kursk region, seemingly flipping the script on the war’s current trajectory.

Kyiv claims its units have pushed more than 20 miles into Russian territory, taking over 74 settlements and towns encompassing some 400 square miles, as well as over 100 Russian prisoners of war.

For its part, Moscow has acknowledged the incursion but as of Wednesday said its military has stabilized the border and is actively fighting to wrest control over those contested areas. Meanwhile, the fog of war has settled in and there is no official confirmation on the number of casualties or actual territorial gains by Ukraine.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has denounced the incursion as a “large-scale provocation.” For its part the Ukraine Foreign Ministry is saying this isn’t about holding territory but stopping long-range missile strikes by Russia into Ukraine from the Kursk region by creating a “buffer zone” there.

So many questions remain about the Ukrainian strategy, the Russian response and what long term impact this may have — or not — on the overall war, including the potential for future negotiations, the effect on morale on both sides, and whether this emboldens Ukraine’s supporters, including the U.S., to help re-energize what was looking like a foundering war effort on the Ukrainian side.

So we put the following question to a well-rounded group of foreign policy experts:

“What is the likely impact of current Ukrainian military incursions into the Russian Kursk region on the broader Ukraine War?”

Jasen J. Castillo, Monica Duffy Toft, Ivan Eland, Mark Episkopos, Lyle Goldstein, John Mearsheimer, Sumantra Maitra, Rajan Menon, Peter Rutland, Stephen Walt

Jasen J. Castillo, Co-Director, Albritton Center for Grand Strategy, George H.W. Bush School of Government, Texas A&M University

Once again, Ukraine’s armed forces have demonstrated their tremendous will to fight, something Russia discounted when they invaded in 2022. Nevertheless, the military objective of this offensive remains unclear. In the short term, this is a public relations boost for Ukraine and a morale blow to Russia. The Kursk gamble might also reduce pressure on Ukraine’s defenses as Russia moves forces to stop the incursion. My worry is that in the longer term, Ukraine, which is facing dangerous shortfalls in manpower and equipment, will deplete elite units that would have been needed elsewhere. In a war of attrition, manpower and equipment are essential. Ukraine’s attack reminds me of Germany’s audacious Western offensive in 1944 that surprised the Allies, made gains, and ended with a defeat at the Battle of the Bulge, which then wasted manpower and equipment it needed months later on the Eastern Front.

Monica Duffy Toft, Professor of International Politics and Director of the Center for Strategic Studies at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

The likely impact of Ukraine’s military incursion into Russia is going to affect two axes of interest; one material, and one psychological.

On the material axis, Ukraine may be able to temporarily degrade Russia’s ability to launch missile attacks against Ukrainian targets, the most sensitive of which involve the deliberate and systematic harm of Ukraine’s noncombatants. But in material terms, not much can be expected in terms of lasting impact. Ukraine will be forced to retreat from Russia, and its surviving troops and equipment will be redistributed, after rest and refit, to other critical areas of Ukraine’s front with Russia.

It is on the psychological axis we can expect the most impact. Already, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s legitimacy as a “great leader” was damaged in the opening weeks of the war. This latest incursion is worse, because no Russian leader can afford to preside over the loss of Russian territory, even temporarily, and survive with reputation intact.

That said, Putin has unprecedented control over what Russians learn about the war. The psychological impact will be most felt by Ukraine and its allies. It will alleviate attention fatigue in the global sphere. It also reminds Western donors that Ukraine can fight and win, so the ongoing sacrifice of sending weapons and ammunition will not be wasted.

Ivan Eland, Director of the Independent Institute’s Center on Peace & Liberty.

Although Ukraine has insisted that its intent is not to hold captured land in Russia, one might then ask what purpose the incursion serves. It may have been designed to shock Russian leader Vladimir Putin about Russia’s vulnerability, but prior raids or attacks on Russia and Crimea have already so demonstrated.

Conducting offensive operations is usually much more costly in personnel and equipment than being on defense, so is it worth it for Ukraine to divert forces from already thin defense lines to go on a risky offensive with only nebulous benefits? Russia’s offensive is already making headway, and because Russia outnumbers and outguns Ukraine, it may not need to denude its attack forces in Ukraine to defend Russian territory. Ukraine indeed may desire to occupy Russian territory to eventually trade Ukrainian-occupied Russian territory for Russian-occupied Ukrainian land in any truce negotiations, but Ukraine risks being surrounded by superior forces.

Mark Episkopos, Eurasia Research Fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and Adjunct Professor of History at Marymount University

The Kursk incursion seems to have been premised on the assumption that Ukraine can exploit Russia’s thinly manned border defenses to seize large swathes of land — including the Kursk nuclear power plant — in the first 48-72 hours, presenting Moscow with a fait accompli that can be used as a bargaining chip to quickly force a ceasefire and potentially even set the stage for peace talks on Ukraine’s terms. But Russia appears to have thwarted the AFU’s attempts to significantly expand its initial beachhead, and Ukraine lacks the long-term capacity to hold even the modest territory that it is currently contesting.

Efforts to keep open the Kursk pocket are unlikely to yield any strategic benefits for Ukraine and will demand a massive sustained investment of troops and equipment that may weaken Ukrainian defenses, inadvertently creating opportunities for Russian forces along the lines of contact in Ukraine’s Donbas region.

Lyle Goldstein, Director of Asia Development, Defense Priorities, and visiting Professor at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University

Kyiv’s brazen offensive into Russia’s Kursk region illustrates that Ukraine still has significant combat capability, as well as some measure of fighting pluck. No doubt the operation has served its primary end to embarrass the Kremlin and so dramatically alter the conventional narrative on the war. Still, legitimate questions can be asked regarding the wisdom of the new offensive. Casualties for the attacking side are inevitably high, especially in circumstances when Russia retains a substantial firepower advantage. This may, in turn, create grave weaknesses on other part of the battle line that Russian forces could exploit. Most informed American strategists had been counseling Ukraine in 2024 to stay on the defensive to preserve its forces and thus adopt a “long war” strategy. Nor is it clear that such a symbolic gambit will make a peace easier to negotiate. Finally, this is yet another step in the inadvisable direction of general escalation.

John Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago, and non-resident fellow at the Quincy Institute

Ukraine’s invasion (of Kursk) was a major strategic blunder, which will accelerate its defeat. The key determinant of success in a war of attrition is the casualty-exchange ratio, not capturing territory, which Western commentators obsess over. The casualty-exchange ratio in the Kursk offensive decisively favors Russia for two reasons. First, it has caused relatively few Russian casualties because Ukraine’s army effectively overran undefended territory. Second, once alerted to the attack, Moscow quickly brought massive airpower to bear against the advancing Ukrainian troops, who were in the open and easy to strike. Unsurprisingly, the attacking forces lost many soldiers and a huge proportion of their equipment.

To make matters worse, Kyiv removed top-notch combat units from the front lines in eastern Ukraine — where they are desperately needed — and made them part of the Kursk strike force. This move is tilting the already lopsided casualty-exchange ratio on that critically important front further in Russia’s favor. It is no wonder — given what a foolish idea the Kursk incursion is — that the Russians were caught by surprise.

Sumantra Maitra, Director of research and outreach, the American Ideas Institute, author of “Sources of Russian Aggression”

If Ukraine taking the war to Russia was to bring Russia to negotiate from a position of weakness, it will fail, simply because Ukrainians don’t have the manpower to sustain this push and subsequent occupation. It is a good PR victory for Ukrainian backers in the West, and it shows how catastrophically backward, incompetent, and Soviet, Russian strategic thinking still is, but the Russian advantage in numbers will remain.

What it also might do is harden the Russian position, embolden the hardliners in the Russian government, and dissuade Putin from pushing for any negotiations for peace, especially after a new administration is elected in the U.S. Which, maybe, was the actual aim of the Ukrainian government, or whoever is advising them. In scuttling that particular process, Ukraine has been successful.

Rajan Menon, non-resident senior fellow at Defense Priorities and the Anne and Bernard Spitzer Chair Emeritus in International Relations at the Powell School, City College of New York/City University of New York.

Ukraine’s Kursk gambit has been widely praised — appropriately. But its enduring success remains uncertain. Whether Gen. Oleksandr Syrskyi seeks to retain Russian territory to trade in future negotiations; to divert Russian forces from the Donetsk battlefields, where they have been advancing; or to make Russians feel some of the pain Ukrainians have since 2022, his ability to achieve one or more of these goals remains uncertain.

Once Russia mounts a persistent counterattack, will Ukraine muster the logistical capabilities, troop numbers, firepower, and air defenses required to sustain its soldiers in Kursk? Will Russia be forced to redeploy forces from Donetsk (so far it has used reserves and troops from the Kharkiv and Kupiansk fronts)? Or will Russia foil Ukraine’s Kursk offensive, transforming the current euphoria into a blame-game in which Ukraine’s leaders are attacked for dispatching to Kursk troops that were badly needed elsewhere? It’s too early to tell.

Peter Rutland, professor of government and the Colin and Nancy Campbell Chair for Global Issues and Democratic Thought at Wesleyan University

The Ukrainian incursion is the most significant challenge to face Putin since the Wagner mutiny of June 2023. It highlights one of the central claims of Evgeny Prigozhin — the corruption and incompetence of the Russian army’s commanders, who did not foresee the attack, and who have been slow to expel the Ukrainian invaders. It refutes some of the central themes in Kremlin propaganda — that Russia is winning the war, that Putin is protecting Russians from a hostile world. It has also called the bluff on Putin’s threats to use nuclear weapons in the event of escalation of the fighting onto Russian territory. Irrespective of the military costs and benefits of the raid, there is no doubt that it has been a political coup for Kyiv.

Stephen Walt, Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs, Yale University

The Ukrainian incursion into Russia is a sideshow intended to bolster Ukrainian morale and give the West confidence to keep backing Kyiv, but it will not affect the outcome of the war. Ukrainian forces have reportedly seized about 1000 square kilometers of poorly defended Russian territory. Russia’s total land mass is more than 17 million square kilometers, which means that Ukraine now “controls” 0.00588% of Russia.

By comparison, Russian forces currently occupy roughly 20 percent of Ukraine and the failed Ukrainian offensive last summer shows how difficult it will be for Ukraine to retake these areas. The incursion may be a minor embarrassment for Putin (as well as additional evidence that Russia is far too weak to invade the rest of Europe), but Ukraine’s fate will be determined by what happens in Ukraine, and not by this operation.

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