Iran and the US: The Core Deadlock in Ongoing Struggles

Key Takeaways

• Iran faces challenges in unofficial communication with the American administration. However, recent diplomatic activities on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly meetings in New York indicate Tehran’s intent to establish channels of engagement with Washington.
• The government of Masoud Pezeshkian aims to use the next three months to develop an “action plan” or at least an “action platform” to build upon if Democrats win the US presidential election, or to counter Washington’s potential escalation if Trump is re-elected.
• The anticipated dialogue between Tehran and Washington is unlikely to focus solely on the nuclear issue, as Iranians prefer. Instead, it will encompass other matters, including Iran’s regional influence, the scope of Iran-Russia cooperation and Tehran’s missile and drone programs.

Iranian media regarded Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s visit to New York to attend the UN General Assembly meetings as a first step toward realigning Tehran’s relationship with the international community, expressing high hopes for the trip. Pezeshkian was accompanied by several officials, notably Vice President for Strategic Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi arrived in New York ahead of Pezeshkian, stating that Tehran seeks to resume negotiations with the international group and revive the nuclear agreement, emphasizing Iran’s openness to diplomacy.

Pezeshkian Government’s Efforts to ‘Manage the American Problem’

Pezeshkian’s visit to the UN General Assembly did not include official meetings with US officials, but it still was significant. The Iranian president and his delegation were interviewed by several American media outlets to provide the international community and American public with the so-called true image of Iran.

The Iran-US relations remain a key international issues for the new Iranian government, which has emphasized its aim to “manage disagreements between the two countries” and prevent them from escalating into a source of successive crises for Iran, as seen in recent years. However, this does not necessarily imply a resumption of ties between the two countries, which have been severed since 1979.

There are indications that the new Iranian government is attempting to establish back-channel communication with the US. Analysts confirm that Tehran is working to reactivate the “Omani door” and activate unofficial channels of communication through its lobbies in the US. In the absence of Rob Malley, Tehran has faced difficulties in maintaining unofficial communication with the US administration. However, recent diplomatic activity on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly meetings in New York indicates a desire to open channels linked to Washington.

The issue of Iran-US ties is particularly critical due to the impact of American sanctions on Iran’s economy. An assessment in Tehran acknowledges that efforts to improve ties with European countries have been hampered by US sanctions imposed on Tehran by the Trump administration in May 2018, which the Biden administration has upheld. Therefore, any attempt to reach a settlement must go through Washington. Arguably, Iran’s foreign policy, especially under conservative governments, revolves around this “American impasse,” making it difficult to envision any solutions without addressing it.

Pezeshkian’s visit to New York was crucial because it coincided with the final months of the Biden administration, which is engaged in a competitive race against Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump. The Iranian government views the next two months as an opportunity to make diplomatic moves before the US presidential election. Pezeshkian’s diplomatic team understands that the Biden administration is effectively a caretaker government but sees a chance to de-escalate tensions and set a foundation for a new reality. This groundwork could potentially be advanced by a future Democratic administration led by Kamala Harris, or at the very least, obstruct efforts to apply further pressure on Tehran. The strategy could even serve to persuade Trump, if re-elected, to consider a change course.

Key Issues on Iran-US Agenda

Amid Iran’s isolation and the broader Middle East crisis, the new government in Tehran views Pezeshkian’s visit as an opportunity to bridge the gap with the Western powers. In his first press conference, Pezeshkian spoke of a potential “brotherhood” between Iran and the US, conditioned on Washington showing goodwill. Foreign Minister Araghchi stated that Tehran is ready to reopen talks on the nuclear issue and resolve disagreements with the West.

For the past two decades, Iran’s nuclear program has been central to American-Western dialogue with Iran. Both Iranian and American hints indicate that Iran’s nuclear program will be the starting point for any potential negotiations. However, given the state of Iran’s nuclear capabilities – which have evolved significantly since talks began at the end of the first decade of the 21st Century – the subject may need to be revisited from scratch.

It is clear that any potential dialogue between Tehran and Washington will not be limited to the nuclear issue, as Tehran prefers. Rather, it will go beyond that this time to include a broader range of issues:

• Regional Expansion: This will be at the forefront of any negotiations between Tehran and Washington. For over two decades, Iran has leveraged its regional influence, through a network of pro-Iran militias engaged in an open confrontation with Israel. No agreement can be reached with Iran today without addressing Iran’s regional expansion and its proxy conflicts with Israel and the US through ideological militias.
• Support for Russia: Western concerns have grown in light of the Iranian-Russian cooperation, particularly Tehran’s support for Moscow in the war against Ukraine. Washington and Brussels view this conflict as an existential threat, and they believe that Tehran is directly involved in this conflict by providing drones and ballistic missiles to Moscow. Despite Iran’s official denial, this cooperation has forced the West to classify Iran as part of the countries that pose an existential threat, resulting in repeated sanctions on Tehran. This Iranian-Russian cooperation is part of a wider track of coordination that has raised fears in the West, especially the US, about shifts in the regional and international balance of power that could disrupt stability. These developments raise the American administration’s concerns as they are seen as part of Tehran’s “Look East” strategy, which aims to strengthen ties with both China and Russia, potentially undermining American regional and international influence.
• Iran’s Missile and Drone Program: This is an urgent issue on any prospective dialogue agenda between Tehran and Washington. Iran’s missile and drone capabilities raise concerns among regional parties, who view them as an immediate threat. This is particularly worrying given Tehran’s track record of supplying these technologies to allied militias and factions involved in civil wars across multiple regions.

Impediments to Progress in Iran-US Negotiations

Several key obstacles hinder potential dialogue between the two countries:

1. Disagreement Over the Scope of Dialogue: Iran prefers that discussions remain focused solely on the nuclear issue or at least begin from this point. In contrast, the US, even under a Democratic administration, has expressed a desire for a more comprehensive dialogue that addresses additional regional and security concerns.
2. Who Makes the First Move? This question poses a significant operational challenge. While both sides may acknowledge the need for dialogue, each expects the other to show goodwill first. This was emphasized in President Pezeshkian’s speech, where he called for gestures from Washington, such as sanctions relief, as a prerequisite for initiating discussions. The US, for its part, insists that Tehran should first demonstrate goodwill through concrete actions.
3. Limitations of the Iranian Government’s Powers: Perhaps the most significant obstacle is the limited authority of the current Iranian government. The Pezeshkian administration lacks the full powers needed to ensure that any dialogue between Tehran and Washington would be successful or productive. While it is believed that President Pezeshkian’s government has received approval from Iran’s Supreme Leader to enter negotiations, this does not guarantee that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – designated a terrorist organization by Washington– will comply with the negotiations or accept any potential concessions.
4. Russia’s Position: Russia appears uneasy with the prospect of Iran shifting away from its traditional alliances, especially under a government that leans more toward the West than the East. Historical precedent shows that Russia has, on multiple occasions, obstructed efforts at Iranian-Western rapprochement, leveraging its influence to pressure Iranian decision-making when it perceives a threat to its interests.
5. Israeli and European Factors: Israel is likely to lead a campaign to block any reconciliation efforts between Tehran and Washington. Similarly, the European Troika (France, Germany and the UK) might also impose obstacles to hinder Iranian-American negotiations.

Features of the Next Phase

Despite the aforementioned obstacles, both Iran and the US are likely to continue efforts to break the deadlock on key contentious issues, and some progress is possible. Given Iran’s concerns about a potential Republican administration led by Trump, its diplomatic team is striving to take advantage of the remaining time in Biden’s term to open a pathway for dialogue. This strategy is built on the following realistic considerations:

• Managing, Not Resolving Tensions: Through negotiations, Tehran seeks only to “manage tension” with Washington, rather than fully resolve their differences. This pragmatic approach, repeatedly emphasized by the new Iranian foreign minister in various interviews, reflects a pragmatic understanding of both the domestic constraints faced by the Iranian government and the practical barriers that prevent complete “Iranian-American normalization.”
• Creating a Negotiation Platform: The Pezeshkian government is attempting to use the next three months to negotiate a “plan of action,” or at the very least, establish a “platform” (a framework for dialogue) that could be leveraged by the next US administration. If a Democratic administration takes office, this platform could serve as a foundation for further talks. If Trump returns to power, it could be used to obstruct potential escalatory moves by the US.
• Reactivation of Communication Channels: It is highly likely that Tehran and Washington will reactivate their exclusive channels of communication within the next three months, either through the Omani channel or by utilizing the lobbies and influence networks established by Zarif’s team in Washington.
• Economic Considerations: The new Iranian government intends to capitalize on these efforts to initiate dialogue with the United States to improve economic indicators. Tehran is seeking goodwill gestures from the US, likely in the form of sanctions relief, easing their enforcement or facilitating access to frozen assets. Such successes are crucial for the Pezeshkian government at this stage, as it needs to demonstrate positive progress to calm public discontent and maintain domestic stability.

Scenarios

During his election campaign, Pezeshkian promised the Iranian people an opening to the world, efforts to end sanctions, a revival of the nuclear deal and improved relations with the international community, all aimed at enhancing Iran’s economic situation. However, numerous obstacles hinder the realization of these promises, suggesting a less optimistic outlook. In this context, three potential scenarios can be outlined:

Scenario One: Prelude to Broader Negotiations

In the coming months, a process may begin to lay the groundwork for more comprehensive negotiations that could lead to the resolution of all or a significant part of differences between Iran and the US. Indicators suggest that the Iranian supreme leader has granted the new government some necessary powers to negotiate specific issues. Additionally, there is a pressing need for Iran to reach a consensus with a potentially cooperative Democratic administration to mitigate the risks of confronting a conservative Republican administration, while also seeking to improve economic indicators to address rising social discontent. However, this scenario faces significant internal, regional and international obstacles, making its realization challenging and unlikely in the near term, though not entirely impossible.

Scenario Two: Limited openness

This scenario posits that Tehran will pursue a limited openness toward Washington in exchange for corresponding, albeit limited, gestures from the US. The goal is to manage tensions between the two countries while securing concessions that would bolster the Iranian government’s economic performance. Influential figures within the Pezeshkian government, particularly the new foreign minister, favor this scenario based on realistic considerations. However, it is likely to encounter challenges, notably the potential lack of commitment from the IRGC and Russia to adhere to the proposed tension management strategy that the new government seeks to implement.

Scenario Three: A New Dialogue Platform

This scenario envisions that the new Iranian government, in coordination with the Iranian Supreme Leader, will establish a new platform for dialogue primarily with the US and, by extension, with the West. Although several issues would be put on the agenda, this does not guarantee that the two sides will necessarily reach agreements on these matters. For Iran, this scenario aims to alleviate US pressure, slow the enforcement of sanctions and secure concessions as part of a strategy involving partial compromises and a rearrangement of geopolitical dynamics.

The deep state in Iran is likely to support the initiation of this new dialogue platform to create additional room for maneuver, gain economic benefits and buy time to advance its strategic projects. However, this scenario could face significant challenges, including potential US rejection of the dialogue initiative and increased regional and international pressures that might hinder its progress.

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