Key Takeaways
- The implications of a Biden or Trump victory in the American presidential election are expected to be particularly evident in Iraq due to the presence of American troops and the potential future challenges of any step to regulate this military presence.
- Both Democrats and Republicans agree on imposing more American pressure on Baghdad as part of financial governance systems. Therefore, controlling Iraq and Iran’s adaptation to these systems will likely remain a persistent issue.
- A Trump return to the White House would create new dynamics, opportunities and challenges in dealing with various Iraqi issues, including the future of American military presence, Washington’s position on internal power balances and Baghdad’s foreign policy. Conversely, a second Biden term would allow the continuation of the current American approach to these issues.
Iraq is one of the arenas where contrasting US approaches would be evident depending on whether former President Donald Trump returns to the White House or incumbent President Joe Biden wins a second term. This contrast would be clear in issues such as the future of the American military presence, the stance on militias, the internal balance of power, governance in Iraq, Baghdad’s foreign policy and Iraq’s relationship with Iran.
Likely Implications of Biden’s Victory
The following are some of the potential key consequences of Biden winning a second term in office:
1. The Future of American Military Presence: Debate over the future of American military presence in Iraq during the Biden administration has taken two primary directions. First, an attempt to contain any political escalation regarding the withdrawal of American troops by the “Coordination Framework” (CF) factions that formed Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani’s government. This could force Baghdad to adopt positions embarrassing for Washington, such as submitting a formal Iraqi request for withdrawal. Second, an effort to avoid any overlap between the withdrawal issue and the presidential election campaigns.
The Biden administration has succeeded in postponing this issue until after the election by addressing Baghdad’s request to end the mission of the “Global Coalition”. According to a joint statement by Biden and Al-Sudani in April 2024, the two sides agreed to “convene later this year the US-Iraq Joint Security Cooperation Dialogue (JSCD) for talks on the future of the bilateral security partnership.” If re-elected, Biden is expected to outline a clear and long-term description for the “military presence”. According to repeated announcements by the Pentagon, a complete withdrawal from Iraq is not on the table.
Biden, who has adopted “calm” and “strategic containment” approaches, may be compelled at the beginning of his potential second term to deal openly with the Iraqi government and its allies about Washington’s desire to reach a security agreement that ensures a “non-combatant” military presence. This presence should be declared in three military bases: “Harir” in Erbil, “Victory” in the vicinity of Baghdad airport and “Ain Al-Asad” in Al-Anbar. Such an agreement might be accepted by Sunnis, Kurds and civil forces in Iraq. However, Shiite actors – who are more influential in the Iraqi government and closer to Iran – and factions outside the government, such the Sadrist Movement (SM), would categorically reject this agreement. This could lead to more complicated relations between Baghdad and Washington, potentially including a return to direct military confrontation.
2. Position on Militias: The Biden administration has tried to contain Iraqi militias in a way that allows for re-categorizing them into two types of groups. The first includes “pragmatic” groups that could engage in political and government action, such as “Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq” (AAH) led by Qais Al-Khazali, “Imam Ali Battalions” (IAB) led by Shibl Al-Zaidi, and “Badr” led by Hadi Al-Amiri, which are declared partners in the government. The second includes “hostile” groups that are militarily targeted, such as “Kata’ib Hezbollah”, “Al-Nujaba Movement” and others. This strategy has relatively succeeded in creating divisions among factions, leading to a temporary freeze of their operations against American troops in Iraq.
It is unlikely that the Biden administration – if he wins a second term – would change its approach of calm and inexpensive containment of Iran’s arms in the region, especially in Iraq. This policy enjoys support within the administration’s circles, which seek to continue attempts to revive the nuclear deal with Tehran and open more channels of covert contacts to consolidate communication between the two sides during the Gaza crisis.
There appears to be a prevailing American inclination to maintain a military presence in Iraq, in some form, regardless of the outcome of the presidential election (AFP).
This policy, which seems “comforting” for CF factions and the Iraqi government as well, faces skepticism among Sunnis and Kurds, some of whom were pressured to accept the new “status quo” balances and engage more in Iran’s project.
However, the new field challenge which the Biden administration could face might come from the return of SM. Muqtada Al-Sadr, leader of the group, has escalated his rhetoric against American troops, recently calling for the expulsion of the US ambassador from Baghdad. This escalation cannot be separated from the repercussions of the “containment policy” that enabled some armed militias to occupy key positions in the government at the expense of other factions.
3. Internal Balance of Power in Iraq:
Sunnis and Kurds believe that the Biden administration’s Iraq policy has disrupted the already fragile balance among social components, leading to excessive domination by pro-Iran Shiite forces.
The constant decline of the Iraqi Kurdistan region’s influence in favor of Baghdad, through decisions by the Federal Supreme Court (FSC), was one of the challenges that worsened during the Biden era. In recent months, the Biden administration has tried to change course by ensuring the temporary flow of salaries for civil servants in Kurdistan. However, this has not been sufficient to end the deterioration in Baghdad-Erbil relations or re-establish the internal balance with Sunni Arabs. One outcome of this imbalance was the dismissal of the speaker of the House of Representatives, the most prominent position for Sunnis in Iraq. This position has been vacant for months, which is in favor of the domination of CF forces.
Shiite factions, even armed ones, have adapted to Biden’s approach on the issue of internal balance more than Sunni and Kurdish factions. Moreover, some civil forces accuse Washington of “turning a blind eye” to the killings, arrest and suppression against protests, and allowing a mechanism that might lead within less than two years to the lifting of monitoring by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) of human rights, minority rights and freedoms in Iraq.
1. Governance in Iraq: The Biden administration has tried to expand governance procedures in Iraq, especially in the financial field. To this end, the US Treasury has banned almost 32 banks from engaging in dollar transactions and included more Iraqi personalities and firms in the economic sanctions’ regime. These measures, which are expected to escalate in a potential Biden second term, have contributed to controlling Iraqi financial procedures and relatively reduced dollar smuggling abroad. However, these measures have also caused domestic economic pressure. It remains difficult to judge their effectiveness, as local economic forces and corruption networks in Iraq have adapted to these mechanisms.
2. Iraq in Its Regional Environment: Iraq’s foreign relations have remained confused and undefined by its own strategic frameworks. An essential part of Baghdad’s foreign relations is based on Tehran’s regional interests. During Biden’s era, these relations became more aligned with Iran’s standards. Consequently, Gulf and Arab policies, which have seen an inclination for defense repositioning during the Biden administration, especially after a series of “facilities” the administration has provided in its first year to Iran and its regional proxies, were forced to view Arab-Iraqi ties as part of the requirements to deal with Tehran’s regional strategy.
During the Trump era, Iraq’s openness to its Arab neighborhood was a strategic gain for the Arabs in terms of adjusting the regional balances disrupted by Iran. Under Biden, these relations have shifted, becoming an Iranian strategic gain to impose new equations.
No clear changes are anticipated in Iraqi-Iranian relations, given the Biden administration’s efforts to open more lines of communication with Tehran to quell regional crises. Additionally, the Biden administration has granted Baghdad more freedom to build broader cooperative relations with China. This is evidenced by several indicators, including Beijing tightening its grip on the Iraqi oil sector, increasing the volume of trade exchange and collaborating with Turkey on the “Development Road” project with its various geopolitical and economic dimensions.
Potential Consequences of Trump’s Victory
1. The Future of the US Military Presence: Even though Trump is unlikely to depart from the Pentagon’s view on the importance of the US military presence in Iraq, a potential large-scale security escalation in the country could push the US toward options such as relocating its troops to the Kurdistan Region. Analysts consider this option the “optimal solution” that “could improve Washington’s image in the eyes of the Iranian-dominated Iraqi government, especially if the US troops remain in Kurdistan, where the United States is still welcomed.” Freed from concerns about protecting its troops, Washington would have more room to engage with Iraq on its relationship with Iran, sanctions-busting and rampant corruption in the country.
2. Attitude Toward Militias: Trump may adopt a pattern of managing “deals” in foreign relations, including with Iran and Tehran-backed militias in Iraq. Although it is unlikely that Trump will stop the current talks with Baghdad on the status of forces and the future of the international coalition, the Trump administration resorting to an escalatory approach and a policy of “confrontation” with militias inside Iraq remains a possibility. Such a course of action would shift the rules and balances within the Shiite forces closest to Iran, favoring more extremist militias like Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), Harakat al-Nujaba and Sayyid al-Shuhada at the expense of other pragmatic militias under the Coordination Framework.
There are concerns that an uncooperative US policy with Baghdad at the intelligence and operational level could contribute to a resurgence of ISIS in areas where it still maintains sleeping cells. Additionally, the withdrawal of US forces to the Kurdistan Region could embolden Erbil to renew its demands for independence.
3. Power Balance Inside Iraq: Anticipating what the Trump administration may offer to maintain balance among Iraq’s components and minorities while continuing Biden’s current measures is challenging. However, if Trump shifts toward a policy of “confrontation” and escalation, Washington may invoke the Strategic Framework Agreement, which forms the legal basis for US-Iraqi relations. This agreement underscores Washington’s commitment to safeguarding democratic institutions and defending minorities. If bilateral relations deteriorate, Washington might consider measures such as maintaining control over the Ain al-Assad base in Anbar or possibly supporting calls for the declaration of a “Sunni region” in Anbar under US protection. While this scenario remains unlikely at present, it is a viewpoint advocated by several Sunni leaders.
The adoption of increased US pressure on Iraq through financial governance regulations seems to be an area of agreement between the Biden and Trump administrations (AFP).
4. Governance in Iraq: The Trump administration may opt to expand governance measures in Iraq, especially given the ongoing financial flows to Iran, which has adapted to the evolving US sanctions regime. US efforts could concentrate on improving transparency and oversight in Iraqi economic, administrative and financial transactions to effectively counter the sophisticated methods of illicit Iranian oil exports. In more contentious scenarios, Trump may escalate measures to include waivers for Iranian gas exports to Iraq or restrict Chinese economic expansion in Iraq.
5. Iraq in its regional context: During a potential second term under Trump, Iraq’s foreign relations will continue to be shaped by previous challenges. Iran, holding significant sway in Iraq’s political landscape, is unlikely to remain passive amidst such developments. It may seek to bolster its position through negotiations with Trump. Domestically, Iran might contemplate concessions regarding the structure of Iraq’s future government and its affiliated militias, potentially granting Baghdad greater autonomy in shaping its foreign relations, particularly with Arab and Gulf states.
Tehran’s support for the resurgence of the Sadrist movement in Iraqi politics or its potential opposition to the next government are among the scenarios it can manage. Ultimately, Iran understands how to navigate Iraq’s sphere of influence, and while granting Baghdad some autonomy in its foreign relations, this autonomy may not be lasting. The Iranian regime can strategically manage its capabilities during phases of tactical retreat in response to American pressure, akin to its approaches during the Kadhimi and Sudani administrations.
Conclusions
It is anticipated that the outcomes of the presidential race between Biden and Trump will significantly impact Iraq, primarily due to the presence of US troops in the country and the complexities associated with regulating this military presence in the future. Potential risks to Iraq and the broader region may arise if Washington pursues a confrontational policy, either directly with Iran or through its proxy militias. Interestingly, the issue of withdrawing US forces from Iraq, which has been pivotal in every presidential election since 2003, appears side-lined in both the Biden and Trump electoral campaigns. This suggests a prevailing inclination to maintain US forces across three bases, potentially encompassing Sunni and Kurdish regions alongside Baghdad, or at the least, consolidating into a single base in the Kurdistan Region.
Given the consensus on increasing US pressure through financial governance systems under both administrations, adjusting Iraqi and Iranian compliance with these systems appears to be a persistent challenge. A return of Trump to the White House would introduce new dynamics, opportunities and challenges in handling various Iraqi matters, while Biden’s re-election would likely mean continuity in the current US approach toward the country.
If Biden prevails, it becomes crucial to establish a unified Arab regional stance aimed at reshaping US policies toward Iran’s proxies in the region, especially in Iraq. This includes re-evaluating containment strategies, which appear to have short-term objectives and have inadvertently strengthened Iranian influence through increased security and economic control over its proxies. In the event of a Trump victory, Iraq’s current government, with less than a year until elections, would need to negotiate temporary compromises with the incoming US administration.
