What factors were at play one year ago that made possible the Hamas offensive and the shocking loss of life?

Raphael S. Cohen The short answer is Israeli strategic hubris. Prior to the October 7 attack, Israel thought it had contained, deterred, and appeased Hamas—by a mixture of building a wall around Gaza, fighting small scale prior wars, and letting economic aid into Gaza and providing limited permits for Gazans to work in Israel. Consequently, the Israeli leadership thought they had the Hamas problem in hand. And as October 7 demonstrated, they did not.

Mark C. Schwartz There was certainly complacency on behalf of the Israeli intelligence services and Israeli Defense Forces Southern Command. Reporting after October 7 documents that there were clear indications and tactical reporting that Hamas was planning a major operation against Israel, yet the warnings were dismissed.

How has the situation in the region changed in the last year?

Brian Michael Jenkins The October 7 attacks dealt a massive blow to Israel’s reputation for superb intelligence, to the collective psyche of the Israeli people, and to the credibility of its deterrence strategy. Operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon may have restored the vaunted reputation of Israel’s intelligence services, but at further cost to its international support.

Michelle Grisé Hamas’s October 7 attacks on Israel and the ensuing Israel-Gaza war have contributed to the destabilization of the broader Middle East over the last year. The Hamas offensive and the war have put a damper on efforts to normalize relations between Israel and other countries in the region. The war has emboldened Iran and its proxies to conduct increasingly provocative attacks, including direct strikes on Israel carried out by Iran and the Houthis.

Cohen In a nutshell, the brewing regional battle between Iran and its proxies versus the rest of the region has come into sharper relief. Most visibly, Israel has fought not only Hamas, but Hezbollah, Iraqi militants, the Houthis, and Iran itself over the past year. Almost as interesting though is what has not changed in the region: The Arab states have not come down harder on Israel. And Saudi Arabia is still flirting with normalizing ties with Israel despite what has happened in Gaza. That shows the durability of those ties.

What are the current prospects for negotiations to end the conflict and stop the loss of life in Gaza?

Schwartz With respect to ending the conflict and addressing the inexcusable loss of innocent lives in Gaza, the United States can and should do more to hold Israel accountable and demand a change in the targeting methodology. I do not understand why the administration is allowing Israel to continue to target Hamas in densely populated areas through air interdiction when the risk to civilians is extremely high.

Cohen What role can international mediators play in facilitating dialogue? The problem with an international mediation is that at this point, arguably, the United States, Qatar, and Egypt want a deal more than the two combatants do. Simply put, there are few deals that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition will accept that would also be acceptable to Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar and vice versa. Both sides view this as an existential struggle, and as such, international diplomacy has struggled.

Where do you think the conflict will be one year from now?

Shelly Culbertson A year from now, it is not unlikely that elements of the conflict in Gaza are ongoing with a continued humanitarian crisis. If military operations are ongoing, it is unlikely that there will be significant rebuilding of devastated civilian infrastructure, and civilian displacement will persist. Given the scale of the destruction, it will take many years, if not decades, for housing, utilities, and other critical infrastructure to be rebuilt.

Schwartz I assess that by the early winter of 2025 to mid-spring, a cessation of conventional combat operations in Gaza will occur. We can expect counterterrorism operations to continue indefinitely until such time that Israel formulates a plan to address long-term security, humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction in Gaza. I believe this planning and its implementation is the most important role the United States can play.

Heather Williams Where we find ourselves a year from now depends primarily on the actions by Iran, Russia, China, and the United States, and whether these countries take steps to play on events to their own national advantage. What is painfully clear, one year later, is that there is no immediate end in sight to the conflict, and Hamas’s brutal assault on October 7 will be one of the most pivotal shaping moments on the modern Middle East.

Cohen As long as the hostages remain unaccounted for and as long as key Hamas leaders most notably Yahya Sinwar remain at large, I expect the war to go on. The fighting though will transform from Israeli large-scale conventional military operations that defined much of the last year to more targeted raids as pockets of Hamas operatives attempt to reconstitute. By contrast, more of the conventional fighting will focus on other theaters like we are seeing with the current war against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

What are the potential regional implications of this attack for neighboring countries and the broader Middle East geopolitical landscape?

Williams In the wake of October 7, a primary question was whether this would be a conflict contained mainly to Israeli-Palestinian territory or develop into a larger regional conflagration. That question was answered in the last few weeks, as events between Israel and Lebanon reached a climax and dramatic actions by Israel make a larger regional conflict nearly inevitable. A desire to secure Israel’s north—where portions of the population have been evacuated since the beginning of the war because of rockets from Hezbollah—and windows for tactical advantage appear to be motivating Israel’s leadership.

How has the U.S. approach to the conflict changed over the last year?

Cohen The Biden administration has backed away from its full-throated embrace of the Israeli position right after the October 7 attacks and tried to embrace more of a mediator role in the conflict—pushing a cease-fire while still supporting Israel’s right to self-defense. Politically though, this is a delicate balance to strike.

Schwartz The U.S. administration has transitioned from unequivocal support for Israel, to genuine frustration and disappointment in how Israel is prosecuting the war in Gaza. On the surface it appears that the Israeli prime minister is very dismissive of the strategic risk Israel is creating for the United States and other allies and partners internationally and the region by its actions external to Gaza and Southern Lebanon.

Jenkins The administration has remained steadfast in its support of Israel but the death toll in Gaza and the appearance of fervent opposition to Israel on college campuses and certain areas of the country have complicated calculations. The United States has tried, in good faith, to persuade Israel and Hamas cease-fires, and has tried to continuously promote the idea that a deal was close. But intermediaries cannot dictate deals. Diplomacy is not alchemy. Neither the United States nor any other external power can impose a cessation of hostilities on belligerents unwilling to stop fighting.

How has the attack influenced U.S.-Israel relations, in terms of military aid, diplomatic support, and intelligence sharing?

Cohen The war has exacerbated a divide in American politics. Historically, Israel enjoyed wide bipartisan support. That’s no longer the case with more progressives and younger voters questioning this core tenet of U.S. foreign policy. The Gaza war has certainly exacerbated this shift and it’s going to continue to influence the politics of American support for years to come.

Grisé For over three-quarters of a century, the strength of the U.S.-Israel partnership has been a cornerstone of American foreign policy, as evidenced by the traditionally bipartisan nature of American support for Israel. Looking forward, the preservation of this relationship remains critical to the security of Israel and to American interests in the broader Middle East. But the Hamas attacks on Israel and the Gaza war have tested this partnership.

Jenkins The war in Gaza has cost Israel support in many segments of American society, support that will not easily be restored. While there have sometimes been intense policy debates, American support for Israel was historically bipartisan. Judging by the reaction to the Gaza war at many of the leading college campuses—the crucible of future leaders—Western attitudes will only further harden against Israel. Israel has an American problem that it will struggle to effectively address.

Schwartz The United States is certainly considering imposing and, in select cases already has imposed, conditionality on the delivery of military aid since October 7. This has been done to influence how Israel is prosecuting the ground and air campaign in Gaza. I do not assess that the conditionality has been successful if you consider the loss of innocent Palestinian lives in Gaza.

What diplomatic challenges does the United States face in balancing its support for Israel with maintaining relations with other Middle Eastern countries and addressing Palestinian grievances?

Schwartz The biggest challenge is managing escalation. I think the Arab countries in the region are much more concerned about the war escalating than they are about the ongoing operations against Hamas. The needless loss of Palestinian civilians is a major concern obviously but even with so many Palestinians killed, we have not seen an uprising in the West Bank or anywhere within Arab countries in the region. Escalation of conflict and a direct war with Iran is the biggest concern.

Grisé Over the last year, the United States has sought to balance providing assistance to Israel—in the form of military aid and intelligence sharing, rhetorical backing, and support for negotiations—while also mitigating civilian harm and preventing the further escalation of hostilities in the region. This balance has become increasingly difficult to maintain as the Israel-Gaza war has continued, particularly as Israeli military operations have led to significant civilian casualties in Gaza and Iran and its proxies have conducted more brazen attacks on targets in Israel, as well as on commercial vessels and U.S. forces in the region.

Cohen It’s important to distinguish here between the public in other Middle Eastern countries and the elite (specifically those in the government). For the former, the Palestinian issue clearly resonates and the anger against Israel is real, so U.S.-Israel ties are a real problem. By contrast, for the latter, the story is more complicated. Many in these countries’ leadership view Hamas as a threat to their own regimes. At the same time, the U.S.-Israeli relationship is somewhat less problematic than it appears at first glance.

What has been the humanitarian impact of the attack on both Israeli and Palestinian civilian populations, and what measures are being taken to address these issues?

Culbertson There has been tremendous loss of life, displacement of civilians, destruction of infrastructure, and degradation of economies. In Gaza, there have been over 41,000 deaths, over 90 percent of the population has been displaced, all schools have been closed since the beginning of the conflict, over half of Gaza’s hospitals and primary health care centers are completely out of service, there’s widespread food insecurity and two-thirds of employment lost, utilities have been severely degraded, and there are an estimated 40 million tons of rubble and debris in Gaza. Israelis have also suffered humanitarian impacts. In addition to the 1,200 initial deaths, many of the 250 Israeli hostages have now died. Over 100,000 Israelis have been displaced, particularly communities near the Gaza Strip and along the southern border with Lebanon. In southern Lebanon, some 210,000 people have been displaced since the fighting began in October 2023.