Minister of Foreign Affairs Nikos Dendias’ Lecture on “Implementing the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean as a case study” at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) (Oslo, 16.02.2022)
Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
First of all, I have to thank you for the invitation. It does me a great honour. And I have to say also as a personal experience after the two COVID years, it is a great pleasure to be at a seminar in which you don’t face a screen, but you face people and you face questions.
Greece views the Eastern Mediterranean region as an area of stability and prosperity, where all countries, all peoples should be able to enjoy peace and security.
A member of the EU, a member of the NATO alliance, Greece actively promotes synergies and regional partnerships based on International Law and the International Law of the Sea. But, needless to say, within the big framework of the United Nation’s Charter.
In this vein, my country has developed close ties with important partners of the region, extending from the Balkans to the Middle East and from North Africa to the Gulf.
On the basis of a common understanding of the Law of the Sea, we are expanding this cooperation also with countries of the Indo-Pacific region.
While advancing our bilateral relations to new heights, we have also pioneered multilateral formats of cooperation dealing with a wide variety of fields.
In this way, we express the voice and fortify the efforts of all those that are committed to safeguarding peace, stability and development.
This is the Greek response to the many challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean and our wider neighbourhood.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
I am not bringing any news to you by saying that Greece is a traditional maritime nation.
The Greek coastline of the mainland, together with the coastline of our islands, is almost 16.000 km. It’s approximately something like the coastline of Africa, a little less. And the Greek islands constitute approximately 1/3 of Greece’s national territory.
My country is opposed to any threat or use of force in settling any disputes, and of course maritime disputes. Greece is a State Party to UNCLOS since 1995. And the universal character of UNCLOS is evidenced by the fact that 168 parties, including the European Union per se, are bound by its provisions.
Greece has developed its policies and actions based on International Law, and of course on International Law of the Sea.
It is on this basis that we have concluded delimitation Agreements with our neighbours.
More specifically, Greece and Italy concluded in June 2020 the Agreement on the delimitation of their respective maritime zones. The delimitation line of this Agreement follows the line agreed upon between the two countries in 1977 on the delimitation of their respective continental shelves.
Two months, later, in August 2020, Greece and Egypt signed an Agreement on the delimitation of the EEZ between our two countries. The Agreement establishes a partial delimitation of the maritime boundaries.
Finally, Greece has repeatedly stated its readiness to start or resume UNCLOS based negotiations with other countries, aiming at concluding similar Agreements.
To this end, talks were initiated in October 2020 between Greece and Albania for the conclusion of a Special Agreement. An Agreement that will bring their maritime delimitation issues before the International Court of Justice.
The implementation of the provisions of UNCLOS entails the exercise by Greece, of its sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in accordance with the Convention, in its maritime zones.
This includes the recently proclaimed Greek EEZ based on the Greek-Egyptian delimitation Agreement.
Furthermore, Greece has recently extended its territorial sea from 6 to 12 nautical miles in the Ionian Sea in western Greece. And it reserves, of course, its right to extend it in other parts of its territory as well.
It has also proceeded to the closure of bays and the drawing of straight baselines in the same region, in accordance with the relevant provisions of UNCLOS.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Challenging the implementation of UNCLOS in the Eastern Mediterranean seriously affects peace and security in our region.
This is demonstrated by the conduct of our neighbour Turkey.
Turkey refuses to adhere to UNCLOS as it does not recognize that islands are entitled to maritime zones.
Neither it recognizes our right stemming from UNCLOS to extend our territorial waters.
To this end, Turkey even threatens Greece with war, should Greece decide to extend its territorial sea beyond 6 nautical miles, according to UNCLOS.
The casus belli, as it is called, was proclaimed by the Turkish National Assembly in 1995.
This stance on the part of Turkey is contrary to the UN Charter and a blatant example of contravention of international law.
It violates the fundamental principles of refraining from the threat or use of force and of the peaceful resolution of disputes among nations.
Moreover, it goes against the basic principles on which NATO is founded.
Withdrawing the threat is a necessary prerequisite for a substantial improvement in Greek-Turkish relations.
Furthermore, Turkey’s illegal conduct in the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean includes violations of Greek territorial waters and Greek national airspace, as well as challenging Greek sovereignty on a number of islands ceded to Greece by related international treaties.
This conduct is paired with the expansionist “Blue Homeland” theory of Turkey.
A theory claiming extended maritime areas in the Aegean Sea and in the Eastern Mediterranean which belong to its neighbours.
UNCLOS which also reflects customary law clearly provides that the islands, regardless of their size, have full entitlement to a continental shelf and an EEZ, as any other land territory.
The signing of the so-called MoU between Turkey and the provisional Government of National Accord of Libya on maritime delimitation in the Eastern Mediterranean is a flagrant case of contravention to these rules of the Law of the Sea.
Delimitation, according to UNCLOS, takes place only between States with opposite or adjacent coasts.
Nevertheless, Turkey and Libya are not States with opposite or adjacent coasts. They have no common boundaries.
The provisions of this illegal MoU deprive Greek islands, including the island of Crete – Crete is the fifth biggest island in the Mediterranean with a population of 600.000 – of their maritime zones beyond 6 nautical miles.
It is obvious that such an action contravenes any sense of geography, logic or maritime delimitation.
Greece constantly declares its willingness to negotiate with Turkey the resolution of the outstanding difference, namely the delimitation of the continental shelf and the EEZ, in accordance always with International Law and specifically the Law of the Sea and, failing an agreement bilaterally, to submit our difference to the Court.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Greece has developed a dynamic approach in promoting International Law and in particular UNCLOS, in international relations.
It has enhanced its relations and it has established partnerships on a bilateral, regional and international level.
This approach contributes to peace and stability in the Aegean Sea, in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond.
Needless to say that I will be extremely happy to answer any questions that you may have.
Thank you so much.
Minister of Foreign Affairs N. Dendias’ response to a question by Ambassador of Turkey to Norway at the panel “Law of the Sea in the Eastern Mediterranean”, following his lecture at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) (Oslo,16.02.2022)
AMBASSADOR FAZLI ÇORMAN: (Turkey’s Ambassador to Norway): It is a pleasure always to see someone from across the Aegean Sea.
MINISTER NIKOS DENDIAS: Thank you for being here Ambassador.
AMBASSADOR FAZLI ÇORMAN: It is my pleasure. Of course, what I heard is not very pleasant.
MINISTER NIKOS DENDIAS: I thought so.
AMBASSADOR FAZLI ÇORMAN: But, of course it is not me to counter all of your arguments. You have a counterpart back in Ankara that would be very happy to discuss all these issues with you. And here in Norway, in Oslo, we are not in a position to solve Turkish-Greek issues. But since you came here and told about these to the audience, I would like to point out a couple of pertinent issues with what you have said, Excellency, respectfully.
You are claiming, or you are saying actually, that Turkey is doing this and that, but you are missing one point; that all of these actions are in response to something you have been doing. So these are consequences. The Turkish-Libyan agreement was also a consequence of something that you also know very well. And the casus belli declaration by the Turkish Grand National Assembly was also a consequence that Greece was telling that they will go ahead unilaterally declaring the continental waters as 12 miles. And this would practically “lock” Turkish waters, Turkey’s ability to reach international waters, and Turkey will be locked into its own territorial waters. That is what you are imposing, or you are trying to tell Turkey.
During the negotiations of UNCLOS, Turkey was a persistent objector to the notion of the islands having exactly the same effect on the delimitation. Because on the Aegean case, it is impossible for us to accept this. The Aegean Sea is a very specific case, and as you were telling, one side of the sea should be able to look at the other side. And delimitation can be done only by the two.
So, in case of Turkish-Greek issues in the Aegean and all other issues, Turkey is in a desire of making true dialogue, solving it through dialogue. And I was very happy to note that next week probably there will be a new chapter of consultative talks between Turkey and Greece, at the Deputy Ministers’ level. And we are actually looking forward to solve all of these issues through dialogue. The Aegean Sea has two sides; there is a land mass on the other side that you are forgetting, that is called Asia Minor, you may remember it from history. And it is the landmass of Asian continent. You would totally like to ignore that. “My island has the same effect into the delimitation, as the landmass of Turkey”. So, this is of course impossible for us to accept and that is the starting point.
You were telling that you were ready to talk to Turkey on the basis of UNCLOS. And Turkey did not join UNCLOS because we cannot accept the situation in the Aegean as the solution. So, we are not able to have this dialogue on the basis of UNCLOS only. As the professor was saying, International Law can be one of the bases of solutions and the others are fairness, equality and mutual rights. If you are ready to accept or to take into account Turkish issues, Turkish rights and Turkish needs in this matter, we can all sit and talk and solve these problems.
And you also failed to mention about the demilitarised status of some of the islands that Ulf mentioned. That is also one of the issues that we would like to discuss when it is about International Law and application of it. I think that according to International Law, Agreements are part of International Law. Direct Agreements and Lausanne Treaty and 1947 Paris Treaty asked you not to militarise some of these islands, which is not acceptable. There are many others but this is just as a beginning.
DIRECTOR OF NUPI ULF SVERDRUP (MODERATOR): Ok, thank you Ambassador. Minister, would you like to respond briefly…
MINISTER NIKOS DENDIAS: I will.
DIRECTOR OF NUPI ULF SVERDRUP (MODERATOR): In some sense, it is an invitation to talk on the conditions…
MINISTER NIKOS DENDIAS: I will. First of all, I want to thank the Ambassador -I said it before- for being here today. Of course, there is no question, so, directly, it was rather a statement.
But, in a way, Ambassador, I would also like to thank you for verifying exactly what I said. Because in the essence, if you allow me to repeat, you said that “it is legitimate for Turkey to issue a casus belli against us, a threat of war. If…”
AMBASSADOR FAZLI ÇORMAN: [Speaking away from microphone. Inaudible]
MINISTER NIKOS DENDIAS: Well, being a diplomat, I take it that interrupting is not within your rules of conduct. Now, I start again: You are saying openly to an audience and likely, also on the internet, that: “threatening with war any country is legitimate”.
But if I remember well from what I was taught in the university, but, also, if I remember well, you [Turkey] have subscribed to the UN Charter. And if you allow me, the Charter totally prohibits the use of force and the threat of the use of force.
So if you will allow me to ask, not you, but Turkey -because it is not a personal issue- isn’t a casus belli exactly what is prohibited by the UN Charter? Does the UN Charter condition this prohibition upon your interpretation of what Greece said it could do according to what, to an International Convention, which 168 parties have subscribed to, with the proud exception of Turkey?
Even the US, which has not ratified the UNCLOS, is advising every country in the world to subscribe to the UNCLOS. And here comes Turkey who says “because I didn’t subscribe to the UNCLOS, you are not allowed to implement UNCLOS, and if you do implement UNCLOS, it’s a threat of war against you, and that’s that, because that’s what I want”.
Is that a reasonable conduct of doing things in the 21st century? Is that really an invitation to a dialogue? Or is it a pure threat -and I could use much harder words than “pure threat”?
So, the truth is that the difference between Greece and Turkey are solvable. Under one precondition: that Turkey comes to the 21st century. If Turkey stays in the 19th century, if Turkey stays in the way that Suleiman the Magnificent was conducting affairs by having the armadas around the Mediterranean, then this is a no go.
It’s a no go, but, in my humble opinion there is the possibility that Turkey will change its ways and its understanding. Because I deeply believe that this is to the benefit of Turkish society. And if I am allowed to repeat myself, there is a huge dynamic that would exist if this issue has been resolved.
And, by the way, last remark, the Ambassador said that the “Turkish-Libyan memorandum” was a reaction to something. What was that something was not revealed to us. But again, the question is: how could an illegitimate reaction be acceptable? I mean, the real answer to that would have been: “no, you are wrong, the ‘Turkish-Libyan memorandum’ is a legal agreement”. I heard that it’s a reaction to something but, yet again, nobody on this earth can defend this “agreement” on legal grounds.
The legal point is exactly the same as if Turkey has delimited with Singapore, or by the way with Brazil, or with Patagonia or whatever. How can that stand in today’s world? Thank you.
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